Specify Privacy Yourself: Assessing Inference-Time Personalized Privacy Preservation Ability of Large Vision-Language Models

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Abstract

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities but raise significant *privacy* concerns due to their abilities to infer sensitive personal information from images with high precision. While current LVLMs are relatively well aligned to protect universal privacy, *e.g.*, credit card data, we argue that privacy is inherently personalized and context-dependent. This work pivots towards a novel task: *can LVLMs achieve Inference-Time Personalized Privacy Protection (**ITP^3**), allowing users to dynamically specify privacy boundaries through language specifications?* To this end, we present **SPY-Bench**, the first systematic assessment of ITP^3 ability, which comprises (1) 32,700 unique samples with image-question pairs and personalized privacy instructions across 67 categories and 24 real-world scenarios, and (2) novel metrics grounded in user specifications and context awareness. Benchmarking the ITP^3 ability of 21 SOTA LVLMs, we reveal that: (i) most models, even the top-performing o4-mini, perform poorly, with only ~24% compliance accuracy; (ii) they show quite limited contextual privacy understanding capability. Therefore, we implemented initial ITP^3 alignment methods, including a novel Noise Contrastive Alignment variant which achieves 96.88% accuracy while maintaining reasonable general performance. These results mark an initial step towards the ethical deployment of more controllable LVLMs. Code and data are at https://github.com/achernarwang/specify-privacy-yourself.

CCS Concepts

• **Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and privacy**; • **Computing methodologies → Artificial intelligence**.

Keywords

AI Alignment, Privacy Protection, Large Vision-Language Models

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

Figure 1: (a) GPT-4o can infer sensitive information like geolocation from images with alarming accuracy. (b) Despite the credit card being explicitly specified as private information in the prompt, Gemini 2.0 Flash still leaks relevant information like card numbers (Sensitive information is redacted).

1 Introduction

Since the emergence of GPT-4V [1], Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) [2, 14, 49, 62] have revolutionized multimodal understanding and generation tasks [21], unlocking unprecedented capabilities in answering contextual questions [26, 41], performing complex reasoning about visual scenes [13, 67], and even infer latent information [65, 76] beyond direct visual perception. However, this remarkable progress comes with growing concerns about *privacy* implications [18, 24], as recent studies have revealed that these LVLMs could extract sensitive personal information from images with alarming precision, including identity attributes, geolocation cues, and object relationships [15, 45, 47, 57], as shown in Fig. 1 (a).

While extensive efforts have been made to handle the privacy risks of LVLMs [24, 78, 80], existing work relies upon an implicit assumption: *privacy preferences are universal and shared across users*, and thus framing privacy through static sensitive attributes. Nevertheless, we argue that *privacy could be highly customized* [52], as reflected in two ways: *(1) Personal preferences* [12, 32] — some users regard specific attributes as private and may feel discomfort when they are disclosed, *e.g.*, gender or age; (2) *Context dependency* [28, 31] — the sensitivity of certain attributes vary across scenarios and may not be considered private in specific situations, *e.g.*, diagnostic imagery is intensely private in social contexts but not for healthcare providers. This discrepancy between predefined privacy taxonomy and flexible human preferences limits LVLMs' effectiveness in real-world privacy protection, as shown in Fig. 1 (b).

To bridge this significant gap, we highlight a new research focus: **I**nference-**T**ime **P**ersonalized **P**rivacy **P**rotection (**ITP^3**) to allow users to dynamically specify privacy boundaries through natural language specifications. ITP^3 involves three desired dimensions of LVLMs' capabilities: (1) strict compliance with user-provided privacy constraints at inference time, (2) context-aware privacy protection in interaction scenarios, and (3) utility preservation of non-sensitive visual information. Grounded in this task, to comprehensively assess the ITP^3 performance of current LVLMs, we introduce the **S**pecify **P**rivacy **Y**ourself **Bench**mark (**SPY-Bench**), comprising *32,700* samples along with image-question pairs and personalized privacy instructions across *67* privacy categories and *24* real-world scenarios. After evaluating and analyzing *21* state-of-the-art open-source and proprietary LVLMs, we find that: (i) they demonstrate alarmingly low adherence to user-specified privacy constraints, with most achieving under 20% compliance accuracy, and even the top-performing o4-mini [51] reaching merely 23.74%; (ii) they perform poorly in contextual privacy understanding, failing to adapt privacy strategies dynamically according to situations.

To address these challenges, we further construct **SPY-Tune**, a fine-tuning dataset aiming to align LVLMs with personalized privacy preferences and thus enhancing their ITP^3 capability. As an initial step, we implement three popular alignment approaches, (1) Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) [79], (2) Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [55], and Noise Contrastive Alignment (NCA) [11], and develop a more effective variant, named NCA-P. All methods manifest satisfactory performance while DPO and NCA are significantly superior, achieving 90%+ compliance accuracy under SPY-Bench. However, we also observe performance degradation in varying degrees caused by them (despite NCA-P achieving a better balance), indicating the necessity of further research to develop better ITP^3 methods and achieve more controllable ethical LVLMs.

In summary, our core contributions are listed as follows: **(1)** To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose and formalize the ITP^3 task, establishing metrics and evaluation protocols for personalized privacy preservation in LVLMs. **(2)** We develop an automated data synthesis pipeline and create SPY-Bench and SPY-Tune, the first benchmark and training set for personalized visual privacy protection. **(3)** We conduct comprehensive experiments and demonstrate existing models' inability in the ITP^3 task and the effectiveness and limitations of current alignment methods. **(4)** We introduce a novel variant of NCA, *i.e.*, NCA-P, which achieves better performance than the original NCA on both SPY-Bench and general utility tasks.

2 Related Works

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), which have witnessed remarkable progress in recent years, are capable of simultaneously accepting and processing both visual and textual inputs. In this field, CLIP [54] and BLIP [36] can be regarded as pioneering works, which employ contrastive learning objectives to align image and text representations during pretraining, demonstrating impressive performance in zero-shot image classification and image captioning respectively. After the emergence of GPT-4V [1], instead of training from scratch, more recent works turn to leveraging the power of pretrained Large Language Models (LLMs) by projecting image embeddings into the language model's textual embedding space, such as LLaVA [41], BLIP-2 [35], and MiniGPT-4 [81]. This paradigm shift enables models to handle a wider variety of visual understanding tasks, including OCR and visual question answering.

Benefiting from the continuous expansion of data scales and advancements in training and alignment techniques, the latest generation of LVLMs, such as GPT-4o [29], Claude [2], Gemini [23, 62, 63], Qwen VL series [4, 5, 66], InternVL series [16, 17], Llama 3.2 [48], GLM-4V [22, 67], DeepSeek-VL2 [70], have achieved unprecedented performance on various challenging vision-language tasks, including high-resolution image understanding, multi-image understanding, video understanding and visual reasoning.

Personalized Alignment. The term *alignment* in the context of modern AI research refers to steering the models' behavior towards human values, preferences, and intended goals. Currently, a wide variaty of alignment techniques, such as Supervised Finetuning (SFT), Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [53] and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [55], have been developed and are extensively employed in model training processes, serving as the fundamental basis for enabling LLMs to better follow human instructions and accomplish various real-world tasks. However, most mainstream alignment techniques focus on aligning the models' behavior to universal human values, such as being helpful, honest, and harmless [3], ignoring the fact that values and preferences may vary across different individuals [25], which signifies the importance of personalized alignment.

With the aim of tailoring LLM behavior for individual users, the core challenge of personalized alignment lies in effectively modeling the diverse spectrum of human preferences. Existing works address this challenge mainly by three approaches [25]: (1) prompt-based preference modeling, which explicitly or implicitly describes personalized preferences through natural language and appends them to user input prompts [33, 34, 37]; (2) embedding-based preference modeling, which encodes personalized preferences into the LLM's textual embedding space [39] or as latent variables of preference distributions [58, 72]; and (3) parameter-based preference modeling, which models personalized preferences at the parameter level through full model parameter training [30] or adapter-based approaches [61]. However, most existing works focus on LLMs,



Figure 2: Illustration of the inference-time personalized privacy protection task. For absolute privacy categories, LVLMs are expected to evade answering the question regardless of the privacy instructions. For customizable privacy categories, LVLMs are expected to respond normally unless the category is explicitly defined as private. Additionally, if the category is deemed non-private in the optionally provided scenario, LVLMs should respond normally regardless of the privacy instructions.

while multimodal models, particularly LVLMs, remain relatively unexplored. Moreover, as the community generally understands alignment from the perspective of aligning response with human preferences (*e.g.*, being helpful and friendly) [68, 74] and reducing harmfulness and toxicity [6, 44], few studies have addressed personalized alignment from privacy perspective, which is particularly important given the diverse privacy preferences of individual users.

The privacy issues in LLMs and LVLMs, which have garnered significant attention and research interest [50, 59, 71], primarily stem from two sources: training data and user inputs during inference. The privacy leakages from training data are made possible because of the strong memorization capabilities of LLMs and LVLMs, which manifests in two typical attack scenarios: Membership Inference Attacks (MIA) and data extraction attacks [59]. Membership inference attacks aim to determine whether a given data point was part of the model's training data, thereby revealing the composition of the training dataset [27, 40]. Data extraction attacks, on the other hand, ultimately extract private information from the training data through model interactions [7, 10]. This is particularly concerning when models are trained on datasets containing substantial personal information, which could lead to severe personal information leakage [7, 9]. While these training data-related privacy issues can be mitigated through various techniques such as data cleaning, machine unlearning [43], federated learning [73], and differential privacy [38], privacy leakage from user inputs during inference presents a more challenging problem.

This inference-time privacy leakage arises from the models' powerful analytical and reasoning capabilities across modalities like text and vision, enabling models to infer potentially private information from seemingly innocuous user inputs [15, 57, 77]. Such attacks are also known as attribute inference attacks [60, 65]. For instance, current LVLMs can deduce precise geographical locations from user-uploaded photographs [47, 69]. It's worth noting that inference-time privacy leakage is not unique to LLMs and LVLMs, as human experts can also infer private information from such inputs, but the emergence of LLMs and LVLMs has made large-scale user information analysis feasible, necessitating increased attention to this issue [50]. Moreover, such leakages are particularly challenging to mitigate through conventional preprocessing such as prompt anonymization or filtering [60], as they involve natural user queries that are difficult to distinguish from legitimate ones and the personalized nature of privacy [52] makes it impossible to predefine universal filtering rules, resulting in limited research progress in this direction. Therefore, we propose the ITP^3 task, aiming to take an initial step to address this challenge.

3 Benchmarking ITP^3 Performance

3.1 Problem Formulation

Given an information category c like *age*, *location*, *etc.*, and an image-question pair $(\mathcal{I}, q)$ that involves c (*e.g.*, an image of a person and asking '*What is the age of the person?*' regarding c=*age*), we aim to assess LVLMs' capability of altering the response to $(\mathcal{I}, q)$ based on whether c is defined as privacy or not. When c is predefined as absolute privacy, LVLMs are expected to evade responding, which means models should either refuse to respond or exclude any content related to c in the answer to $(\mathcal{I}, q)$. In contrast, if c is not predefined as absolute privacy, LVLMs should respond normally unless users explicitly define c as private by giving natural language instructions i such as '*Age is considered as private information.*'

Furthermore, the privacy level of an information category may vary across different scenarios. For instance, *names of people* are generally considered private, yet their disclosure becomes necessary in certain legal circumstances. To account for this, we introduce the concept of scenario s into the framework above. When category

Table 1: Dataset statistics

	Categories	Images	Questions	Scenarios	Samples
SPY-Bench	67	2,725	6,700	24	32,700
SPY-Tune	51	4,206	16,677	18	81,096

c is deemed non-private within scenario s, which is designated as a conflict scenario, the model should provide a standard response to $(\mathcal{I}, q)$, notwithstanding any user-defined privacy instructions that designate c as private. Contrarily, a non-conflict or compatible scenario is defined as a scenario where the sensitivity of c is not affected by the scenario, which means the model should respond normally to $(\mathcal{I}, q)$ unless the user explicitly defines c as private. However, this does not apply to absolute privacy categories, where the model should refuse to respond regardless of the scenario. Refer to Figure 2 for a visual illustration with examples.

3.2 Data Construction

To facilitate the evaluation and alignment on personalized privacy preservation ability of LVLMs, we construct SPY-Bench and SPY-Tune, a comprehensive benchmark and training dataset containing users' privacy preferences across diverse scenarios. Formally, SPY-Bench is denoted as $\{(c, \mathcal{I}, q, i_p, i_n)\}$, where c is the information category, $\mathcal{I}$ is the input image that depicts information about c, q is the input question which is relevant to c and optionally includes a scenario s as context, and i_p, i_n are privacy instructions specifying c as private or non-private respectively. The SPY-Tune, on the other hand, is defined as $\mathcal{D} = \{(c, \mathcal{I}, q, i_p, i_n, y_r, y_e)\}$, additionally including model's responding answers y_r and evading answers y_e.

Image Collection. All the images are sourced from VISPR [52], a meticulously annotated image dataset where each image is labeled with multiple personal information categories by human annotators. We select images from VISPR's test set for SPY-Bench and training set for SPY-Tune to ensure no overlap between the two datasets.

Text Data Generation. We employ a systematic generation process to generate text data $\{(q, i_p, i_n, y_r, y_e)\}$ with 3 steps: (1) First, we use GPT-4o [29] to generate diverse templates for scenarios s (*e.g.*, '*You are a doctor analyzing patient data . . . The question is: { }*') along with privacy instructions i_p and i_n (*e.g.*, i_p'*={} is considered as private information.*'); (2) Then, for each image $\mathcal{I}$ and corresponding annotated category c, we generate question-response pairs $\{(q, y_r, y_e)\}$ using InternVL 2.5 78B [16]; (3) Finally, for each pair $(c, \mathcal{I}, q, y_r, y_e)$, we randomly select instruction templates for i_p and i_n. The templates are populated with the category c. Optionally, we also select and populate a scenario template with the question q, forming the final pair. Refer to Sec. 3.5 for scenario selection details.

Quality Control. To ensure the quality of the generated text, we adopt the following mechanisms: (1) Deduplication: We remove duplicate questions after generation; (2) Category Consistency Verification: We classify the generated questions and responses against VISPR's original categories, retaining only instances consistent with the target category c; (3) Question-Answer Consistency Verification: We filter out data pairs where the generated answers do not directly respond to the corresponding questions. (4) Human Review: We randomly sample ~500 samples and manually review the generated text to ensure it is natural and reasonable.

Table 2: Benchmark comparison. Metrics are scaled to [0,100].

	Samples	Self-BLEU↓	CLIP Score↑	Cos Sim.
OK-VQA [46]	14,055	**59.99**	<u>18.66</u>	-
Multi-P^{2}A [77]	31,962	100.00	15.74	9.05
SPY-Bench	32,700	<u>81.51</u>	**20.49**	16.76

3.3 Benchmark Comparison

To validate the quality of our dataset, we compare SPY-Bench with OK-VQA [46] (a human-annotated VQA dataset) and Multi-P^{2}A [77] (a recent multimodal privacy dataset sharing the same image sources). We evaluate text diversity using Self-BLEU [82], image-text alignment using CLIP Score [54], and naturalness via cosine similarity with OK-VQA embeddings [56]. As shown in Table 2, SPY-Bench achieves superior text diversity and higher naturalness compared to Multi-P^{2}A, with better image-text alignment.

3.4 Metrics Design

To better evaluate the actual ITP^3 performance of LVLMs, we design a set of metrics to measure the compliance of LVLMs with personalized privacy constraints.

Refuse-to-Answer Rate (RtA). Inspired by Multi-P^{2}A [77], for questions involving user-specified sensitive categories that models are expected to evade, we adopt RtA as a basic metric to measure the models' ability to preserve privacy:

$$\text{RtA} = N_{\text{refuse}}/N_{\text{total}} \tag{1}$$

where N_{total} is the count of samples where categories are specified as private by the user, and N_{refuse} is the count of samples where models correctly evade questions.

Agree-to-Answer Rate (AtA). For samples where categories are specified as non-private by the user or have conflict with given scenarios, models should respond to questions normally unless the categories are pre-defined as absolute privacy. To measure models' behavior in such situations, we define AtA as:

$$\text{AtA} = N_{\text{desired}}/N_{\text{total}} \tag{2}$$

where N_{total} is the count of samples where categories are specified as non-private by the user or have conflicts with given scenarios. N_{desired} is the count of samples where models normally respond for customizable categories and evade for absolute privacy categories.

Harmonic Mean Score (HMS). To balance both evading and responding capabilities, we introduce the Harmonic Mean Score (HMS) as the harmonic mean of RtA and AtA:

$$\text{HMS} = \frac{2 \cdot \text{RtA} \cdot \text{AtA}}{\text{RtA} + \text{AtA}} \tag{3}$$

This metric penalizes models that exhibit extreme bias toward either always refusing or always responding, encouraging a balanced approach to privacy protection and information provision.

Instruction Compliance Score (ICS). In addition to the aforementioned metrics, we also need to precisely measure the compliance of LVLMs with the user's privacy instructions. Given privacy category c and question q, there are four possible situations based on the user's privacy preference and model's response (Table 3). Based on the category type and scenario context, we define the expected model behavior as follows: For absolute privacy categories,

Table 3: Privacy instruction compliance situations.

	Preference	Model's Resp.	Expected When
①	Private Not Private	Evade Evade	c is absolute privacy
②	Private Not Private	Evade Respond	c is customizable privacy and compatible with s (if given)
③	Private Not Private	Respond Evade	-
④	Private Not Private	Respond Respond	c is customizable privacy and conflicts with given s

models should always evade responding regardless of user preference or scenario context (①). For customizable privacy categories, models should follow user preferences when no conflicting scenario is present (②), but should prioritize scenario requirements over user preferences when a conflict scenario is given (④). Thus, the Instruction Compliance Score (ICS) can be calculated as:

$$\text{ICS} = \frac{N_1^{\text{abs}} + N_2^{\text{cust}} + N_4^{\text{conf}}}{N_1 + N_2 + N_3 + N_4} \tag{4}$$

where N_1^{abs} is the count of absolute privacy situations in ①, N_2^{cust} is the count of customizable privacy with compatible scenario situations in ②, N_4^{conf} is the count of customizable privacy with conflict scenario situations in ④, and $N_1 \sim N_4$ is the count of ① to ④.

3.5 Evaluation Setup

Following the construction procedure described in Sec 3.2, SPY-Bench consists of ~2.7k images and 6.7k questions (Table 1). For each image-question pair $(\mathcal{I}, q)$ regarding the information category c, we evaluate the model's responses under 5 situations according to whether the pair is combined with a scenario s and whether c is specified as private by given instructions: (1) without s and c is specified as private, where models are expected to abstain from responding; (2) without s and c is specified as non-private, where models are expected to respond; (3) with a non-conflict scenario s and c is specified as private, where models are expected to abstain from responding; (4) with a non-conflict scenario s and c is specified as non-private, where models are expected to respond; and (5) with a conflict scenario s and c is specified as private, where models are expected to respond. Finally, 6.7k image-question pairs generate 32.7k unique samples in total.

For situations (1) and (2), we compute the ICS. For situations (3) and (4), we combine them to compute ICS and also report RtA and AtA respectively. For situations (5), we compute the AtA. Additionally, we calculate the harmonic mean (HMS) of the RtA from situation (3) and the AtA from situation (5).

To better reflect real-world ITP^3 deployment scenarios, where users typically provide multiple privacy instructions at a time and not all of them are relevant to current query, we evaluate SPY-Bench under 2 settings: (1) **w/o distractors** which includes only one instruction targeting c ; (2) **w/ distractors** which includes 1 instruction targeting c along with 5 additional instructions targeting irrelevant categories. The evaluation encompasses 18 open-sourced and 3 proprietary LVLMs (listed in Table 4), and we use GPT-4o to evaluate whether they respond to or evade the input question.



Figure 3: ITP^3 performance across Qwen 2.5 VL series.

3.6 Evaluation Results

Table 4 presents the comprehensive results of evaluated LVLMs on SPY-Bench. We analyze the results from the following perspectives.

Overall Performance Assessment. Across all evaluated models, the instruction compliance scores (ICS) on the without scenarios part of SPY-Bench remain remarkably low, with most models achieving less than 20% compliance in following personalized privacy instructions. The best-performing models, o4-mini [51], achieve only 17.43% and 23.74% ICS respectively. Similarly, the Harmonic Mean Scores (HMS) on the w/ scenarios part of SPY-Bench across all evaluated models remain consistently low, with the majority achieving below 45%. Even the top-performing models like InternVL 2.5 38B and GPT-4o reach only 41.04% and 48.31% HMS respectively, reflecting the inherent difficulty in balancing privacy protection and responsive capabilities. These consistently low scores across both ICS and HMS metrics indicate a fundamental limitation in current LVLMs' ability to dynamically adapt their responses based on user-defined privacy constraints. We hypothesize this limitation stems from the inherent conflict between personalized privacy preferences and models' pre-trained universal privacy understanding, while GPT-4o's relatively superior performance suggests that stronger instruction-following capabilities contribute to better personalized privacy compliance.

Scenario-Based Analysis. Models exhibit varying behaviors across different scenario contexts. In scenarios where models should respond (non-conflict scenarios with categories specified as non-private and conflict scenarios), most models demonstrate reasonable agree-to-answer rates (AtA) around 80%~90%. However, when models should refuse answering (non-conflict scenarios with private categories), refuse-to-answer rates (RtA) remain considerably limited, typically below 30%. Even the best-performing models like InternVL 2.5 38B achieve only 29.34% RtA, while GPT-4o reaches 40.79% RtA on the w/ distractors setting. This reveals that current models tend to directly answer questions even when users explicitly specify categories as private, demonstrating inadequate privacy instruction compliance and serious privacy leakage tendencies. The disparity indicates a systemic bias toward information disclosure rather than protection in current training paradigms.

Impact of Model Size. Larger models within the same model family generally outperform their smaller counterparts in instruction compliance. We plot the ICS and HMS across the Qwen 2.5 VL series in Figure 3, from which we can see that 32B and 72B models perform significantly better than 3B and 7B models. Interestingly, we observe that the 72B model does not consistently show better performance compared to their 32B counterparts. We hypothesize that this may be due to diminishing marginal returns in privacy

Table 4: SPY-Bench results with scores scaled to [0,100]. The best and second best are marked in bold and underlined respectively.

models	SPY-Bench w/o distractors						SPY-Bench w/ distractors					
	w/o scenario	w/ scenario					w/o scenario	w/ scenario				
		non-conflict			conflict			non-conflict			conflict	
	ICS↑	RtA↑	AtA↑	**ICS↑**	AtA↑	**HMS↑**	**ICS↑**	RtA↑	AtA↑	**ICS↑**	AtA↑	**HMS↑**
LLaVA 1.5 13B	2.70	7.82	88.85	4.90	87.47	14.36	1.90	8.36	88.12	4.54	87.15	15.25
LLaVA NeXT Vicuna 13B	8.45	14.31	86.24	8.67	82.36	24.39	5.64	15.40	83.25	7.09	81.68	25.92
LLaVA OneVision Qwen2 7B	2.51	4.66	89.33	2.46	**91.31**	8.86	1.99	6.39	87.07	2.43	**90.05**	11.93
Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct	13.64	27.24	88.21	22.06	67.37	38.79	8.49	15.88	88.22	11.40	81.07	26.56
Pixtral 12B	4.19	21.13	89.82	17.73	75.76	33.05	4.67	21.22	87.34	16.15	75.22	33.11
GLM 4V 9B	10.33	28.94	77.16	14.96	68.98	40.77	8.15	36.04	68.07	13.22	63.95	46.10
Deepseek VL2	2.70	7.42	88.40	3.84	87.64	13.68	2.39	7.22	86.91	2.31	87.66	13.35
InternVL 2.5 4B	9.45	20.60	83.79	11.22	75.81	32.39	5.81	16.94	81.30	5.99	78.51	27.87
InternVL 2.5 8B	8.06	19.99	84.96	11.99	76.58	31.70	5.63	17.42	81.96	6.72	78.07	28.48
InternVL 2.5 38B	11.66	**29.34**	86.39	22.54	68.25	**41.04**	11.70	29.91	84.15	20.69	68.25	41.59
InternVL 2.5 78B	17.22	27.69	84.85	19.34	69.24	39.56	10.84	24.55	83.13	14.63	72.14	36.64
Qwen2 VL 7B Instruct	3.06	6.31	89.92	4.28	88.69	11.79	2.75	6.63	89.31	3.94	88.51	12.33
Qwen2.5 VL 3B Instruct	4.21	8.63	87.63	4.85	86.53	15.69	2.81	9.21	86.19	3.73	86.36	16.64
Qwen2.5 VL 7B Instruct	7.21	12.61	87.31	7.97	82.20	21.87	4.87	12.51	84.55	5.51	82.88	21.73
Qwen2.5 VL 32B Instruct	13.99	25.25	90.64	**23.28**	69.66	37.07	17.60	24.70	89.40	21.73	70.92	36.64
Qwen2.5 VL 72B Instruct	16.34	24.52	89.75	21.93	70.81	36.43	15.45	23.84	88.58	20.01	71.71	35.78
Phi 4 Multimodal Instruct	16.90	9.16	85.77	4.51	86.07	16.56	6.85	12.28	83.61	4.96	84.81	21.46
Mistral Small 3.1 24B Instruct 2503	11.10	21.27	87.42	16.55	73.71	33.01	15.81	28.10	85.54	20.90	68.51	39.86
GPT 4o 2024-11-20	13.27	26.85	87.58	20.69	71.64	39.06	21.10	**40.79**	86.42	**32.60**	59.24	**48.31**
Gemini 2.0 Flash	9.64	10.75	**90.91**	9.28	84.98	19.08	10.51	13.33	**90.54**	11.54	82.86	22.96
o4-mini 2025-04-16	**17.43**	23.32	88.32	17.56	73.44	35.40	**23.74**	31.07	89.10	25.87	66.01	42.25



Figure 4: ICS and HMS over different numbers of distractors.



Figure 5: ICS performance across different privacy categories. Absolute privacy categories are marked in red.

protection capabilities when scaling from 32B to 72B parameters, particularly in the absence of specialized privacy-focused training data. This suggests that simply increasing model size may not be the most effective approach for improving privacy protection capabilities without targeted training on privacy-related tasks.

Impact of Distractors. Comparing the results with and without distractor settings in Table 4, we observe that the introduction of distractor instructions substantially degrades ICS performance for most models like LLaVA, Llama, Phi-4, *etc.* This is reasonable as the distractor instruction could confuse the model with the target privacy instruction and degrade the instruction-following capabilities. However, we also surprisingly find that GPT-4o and Mistral Small 3.1 24B actually show improved ICS performance when distractors are introduced. This counterintuitive result suggests these models may possess stronger privacy awareness and instruction-following capabilities that allow them to better parse and prioritize relevant privacy instructions even in the presence of distractors. To further investigate this phenomenon, we conducted additional experiments varying the number of distractors, as shown in Figure 4. The results confirm our initial observations, with GPT-4o and Mistral Small 3.1 maintaining robust performance even as the number of distractors increases, while other models show more significant degradation.

Category-level Analysis. We plot the category-level ICS performance on w/Distractor setting in Figure 5, which reveals significant performance variations across different categories. Counterintuitively, models struggle considerably with absolute privacy categories, such as “National Identification”, “Passport”, and “Driver License”, as well as categories like “Credit card”, “Receipt”, and “Email”, all showing darker regions indicating poor compliance. Conversely, models demonstrate better performance on “Approximate age”, “Gender”, and “License plate”, which display lighter

Table 5: Acc. of GPT-4o evaluation against human judgments.

User #1	User #2	User #3	Majority Vote
97.00	96.00	97.00	97.00

colors. This suggests that models find it paradoxically more difficult to refuse answering questions about traditionally sensitive information like identification documents and financial details. This category-dependent behavior highlights the need for targeted privacy-aware training strategies.

3.7 Human Evaluation

We validate GPT-4o's reliability as a response evaluator by testing its classification accuracy against the classification results of 3 human experts on 100 random model responses and their questions (The Fleiss' kappa [19] of human results is 91.69%, showing high consistency). As shown in Table 5, GPT-4o aligns closely with human judgments, confirming our automated evaluation's validity.

4 Boosting ITP^3 Performance

4.1 Approaches

The results on SPY-Bench demonstrate that current LVLMs struggle with privacy-aware tasks, and simply scaling up model size or improving general capabilities does not directly translate to better performance in this domain, necessitating the development of specialized algorithms. To address this problem, we primarily investigate four improvement methods based on previous works: Self-Moderation [15], SFT, DPO [55], and NCA [11], along with an adaptation built upon NCA that incorporates task-specific characteristics, which are introduced as follows.

Self-Mod(eration) [15] is a training-free method that prompts the LVLMs to reflect their first response to the input query and regenerate responses. Similar to [15] we also adopt a two round strategy: (1) after the first response, we prompt the privacy instructions to the model again and ask it to generate a new response; (2) then we ask the model '*Are you sure?*' and instruct it to generate response once again as the final output.

SFT is one of the most commonly used fine-tuning methods that directly optimizes the model with the autoregressive loss. For a given data pair $(c, \mathcal{I}, q, i_p, i_n, y_r, y_e)$ in SPY-Tune, we combine the image $\mathcal{I}$, privacy instructions $i \in \{i_p, i_n\}$, question q, and corresponding expected response $y \in \{y_r, y_e\}$ as one training sample.

DPO [55] is another widely adopted alignment method, which learns the Bradley-Terry [8] model from paired preferred and dispreferred samples. The loss in our task can be written as:

$$\mathcal{L} = -\mathbb{E}\left[\log\sigma\left(r(\mathcal{I}, i, q, y_w) - r(\mathcal{I}, i, q, y_l)\right)\right] \tag{5}$$

where $r(\mathcal{I}, i, q, y) = \beta \log \frac{\pi_\theta(y|\mathcal{I}, i, q)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y|\mathcal{I}, i, q)}$, π_θ is the target model, π_{ref} is the reference model, σ is the sigmoid function, β is a hyperparameter, $y_w, y_l \in \{y_r, y_e\}$ are the preferred and dispreferred responses according to the optional scenario context s in the question q and privacy instruction $i \in \{i_p, i_n\}$ that targets the category c. The specific preferred/dispreferred response y_w/y_l assignment follows the expected behaviors defined in Table 3.

NCA [11] is also a contrastive learning method similar to DPO but learns the absolute reward for each sample, thus guaranteeing the likelihood of preferred samples always increases. The loss function in our task can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L} = -\mathbb{E}\,[&\log\sigma\left(r(\mathcal{I}, i, q, y_w)\right) + 0.5\log\sigma\left(-r(\mathcal{I}, i, q, y_w)\right)\\ &+0.5\log\sigma\left(-r(\mathcal{I}, i, q, y_l)\right)]\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

NCA-P(riv). Inspired by the low ICS results in the SPY-Bench, we hypothesize that pretrained LVLMs fail to capture the literal nuances in user privacy instructions when specifying information category c as private (i_p) or non-private (i_n). We thereby propose that putting both private and non-private cases for given c in one loss function could help improve the model's awareness of such differences. Thus NCA objective can be further extended as:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L} = -\mathbb{E}[&\log\sigma(r(\mathcal{I}, i_p, q, y_{pw})) + \log\sigma(r(\mathcal{I}, i_n, q, y_{nw}))\\ &+ 0.5\log\sigma(-r(\mathcal{I}, i_p, q, y_{pw})) + 0.5\log\sigma(-r(\mathcal{I}, i_p, q, y_{pl}))\\ &+ 0.5\log\sigma\left(-r(\mathcal{I}, i_n, q, y_{nw})\right) + 0.5\log\sigma(-r(\mathcal{I}, i_n, q, y_{nl}))]\end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

where $y_{pw}, y_{pl} \in \{y_r, y_e\}$ denote preferred/dispreferred responses given instruction i_p, and $y_{nw}, y_{nl} \in \{y_r, y_e\}$ likewise given i_n.

Table 6: Evaluation results with scores scaled to [0,100].

Methods	w/o distractors		w/ distractors	
	w/o scenario ICS↑	w/ scenario HMS↑	w/o scenario ICS↑	w/ scenario HMS↑
Qwen2 VL 7B	3.06	11.79	2.75	12.33
+ Self-Mod.	20.30	45.31	9.45	35.25
+ SFT	66.30	83.69	75.75	85.29
+ DPO	92.76	<u>88.10</u>	91.43	<u>87.70</u>
+ NCA	<u>97.40</u>	87.73	<u>96.54</u>	87.05
+ NCA-P	**97.70**	**88.41**	**96.88**	**88.11**

Table 7: Evaluation results on general capabilities. The first row of Qwen2 VL 7B is the officially reported results[64].

Methods	MMMU_{Val}↑	OCR↑	MME↑	Overall↑
Qwen2 VL 7B	54.1	845	2326.8	-
	50.44	**862**	**2324.16**	24.93
+ Self-Mod.	**50.44**	**862**	**2324.16**	34.25
+ SFT	5.56	311	1558.47	43.89
+ DPO	47.89	<u>830</u>	<u>2182.43</u>	<u>75.99</u>
+ NCA	<u>49.56</u>	795	2027.87	75.51
+ NCA-P	48.78	799	2138.36	**78.61**

4.2 Experimental Setup

The SPY-Tune dataset, constructed as described in Sec 3.2, consists of ~4k images and ~16k questions. Similar to Sec 3.5, each pair is extended to about 5 samples based on scenario s and whether c is specified as private. Every sample is then paired with an instruction targeting c and 5 additional unrelated instructions. We use Qwen2 VL 7B Instruct [66] as the base model for the above approaches.

4.3 Evaluation Results

The evaluation results on SPY-Bench of all methods are shown in Table 6, from which we can see all methods significantly improve the performance compared to the original Qwen2 VL 7B model. Among them, NCA-P achieves the best performance, with ICS of 96.88% and HMS of 88.11% on the w/ distractors setting, proving the effectiveness of said loss form. We also compare the performance of all methods on benchmarks which measure the general capabilities



Figure 6: Case study. LEFT: Customizable privacy category case. MIDDLE: Customizable privacy category with conflict scenario case. RIGHT: Absolute privacy category case. The response marked as original is generated from Qwen2 VL 7B Instruct.

of LVLMs, including MMMU_{Val} [75], OCRBench [42] and MME [20]. The results are shown in Table 7. From the results, we can see that all fine-tuning approaches lead to worse performance on general capabilities benchmarks to an extent, while SFT suffers the most severe degradation. To further analyze the overall trade-off between the performance on SPY-Bench and the general capabilities, we calculate an overall score, which is computed by taking the harmonic mean of two arithmetic means: (1) the average of ICS and HMS scores from SPY-Bench, and (2) the average of normalized scores (0-100) from MMMU_{Val}, OCRBench, and MME. The result shows that NCA-P achieves the best score, again proving its effectiveness.

4.4 Case Study

To demonstrate the performance of different methods more intuitively, we present three representative cases in Figure 6. In the left panel which is a customizable privacy category case, when asked about the license plate number with instructions treating it as sensitive information, baseline methods like Self-Moderation, SFT and NCA incorrectly provide the complete number, violating the privacy instruction. In contrast, DPO and NCA-P show improved awareness by refusing to provide the complete number. The middle panel presents a more challenging case where address information is marked as private, yet the scenario involves law enforcement analysis and conflicts with the category. Here, we observe that all the fine-tuning baselines completely refuse to provide location details, while Self-Moderation and NCA-P excel by providing a balanced response that acknowledges the general location. The right panel tests the models' ability to recognize absolute private information, like identification documents' expiration dates. While SFT, NCA, and NCA-P correctly refuse to provide this sensitive information, the Self-Moderation and DPO attempt to provide the information and fail in this case. Overall, NCA-P demonstrates superior nuanced understanding of privacy contexts, effectively balancing helpful assistance with privacy protection requirements.

5 Conclusion

In this work, we introduce Inference-Time Personalized Privacy Protection (ITP^3), a novel paradigm that enables users to dynamically define privacy boundaries for Large Vision-Language Models through natural language specifications. Through SPY-Bench and SPY-Tune, we established the first comprehensive benchmark and training dataset for personalized visual privacy protection, encompassing 32,700 unique samples across 67 privacy categories and 24 real-world scenarios. Our evaluation of 21 LVLMs reveals critical gaps in current models' ability to respect personalized privacy constraints, with even state-of-the-art models like o4-mini achieving merely a 23.74% compliance score, demonstrating the insufficient awareness of personalized privacy protection in current LVLMs.

To address these limitations, we explore multiple approaches and propose NCA-P, a novel adaptation of Noise Contrastive Alignment that explicitly models the contrast between private and non-private cases. Our experimental results show that NCA-P achieves remarkable improvements, reaching 96.88% compliance on SPY-Bench while maintaining reasonable performance on general capability benchmarks. This work establishes ITP^3 as a fundamental requirement for ethical deployment of multimodal AI systems, bridging the gap between rigid privacy definitions and fluid human preferences. Future work should focus on developing more sophisticated training strategies that can better balance privacy protection with model utility across diverse real-world applications.

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